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COMMON MATERIALS TURNED DEADLY: 
HOW MUCH DOES AMERICA HAVE TO MONITOR TO 
PREVENT FURTHER ACTS OF TERRORISM?
dori persky1
inTroducTion
In this age of terrorism, the focus tends to be on the next big terrorist plot, usually involving 
mass chemical weapons, biological warfare, or nuclear devices.  However, people often fail to con-
sider the many ways in which explosives can be created using materials that anyone can purchase.  
Most recently this was brought to light with the Boston Marathon Bombings.  On April 15, 2013, 
WZRSUHVVXUHFRRNHUERPEVH[SORGHGQHDUWKHÀQLVKOLQHRI WKH%RVWRQ0DUDWKRQNLOOLQJWKUHH
people and injuring 264 others.2  In the investigation that followed, police discovered that the bombs 
ZHUHFUHDWHGXVLQJSUHVVXUHFRRNHUVJXQSRZGHUH[WUDFWHGIURPÀUHZRUNVJOXHQDLOVDVVKUDSQHO
and what may have been Christmas tree lights as initiators.3:LWKWKHH[FHSWLRQRI ÀUHZRUNV4 all of  
these items can be purchased without regulation. 
%XWWKH%RVWRQ0DUDWKRQ%RPELQJV%RVWRQ%RPELQJVDUHQRWWKHÀUVWWLPHVXFKFRPPRQ
materials were used for deadly purposes.  Insurgents in Afghanistan and Iraq have been using impro-
vised explosive devices (IEDs) made with pressure cookers for many years.5  Additionally, terrorists 
used pressure cooker bombs in the 2006 Mumbai train explosions, which killed over 200 people.6  In 
fact, the Department of  Homeland Security (DHS) issued an internal memorandum regarding the 
use of  such devices in 2004, warning that “these types of  devices can be initiated using simple elec-
1 J.D. Candidate, May 2015, American University Washington College of  Law; B.A. European Studies, 2009, Vanderbilt 
University.
2 Deborah Kotz, Injury Toll from Marathon Bombs Reduced to 264, bosTon globe, Apr. 24, 2013, available at http://
www.bostonglobe.com/lifestyle/health-wellness/2013/04/23/number-injured-marathon-bombing-revised-downward/
NRpaz5mmvGquP7KMA6XsIK/story.html; see Caitlin Dewey, Homeland Security Warned About Terrorist Use of Pressure 
Cooker Bombs in 2004, wash. posT, Apr. 16, 2013, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/worldviews/
wp/2013/04/16/homeland-security-warned-about-terrorist-use-of-pressure-cooker-bombs-in-2004/ (explaining that the 
Department of  Homeland Security warned about the potential use of  pressure cookers to create improvised explosive 
devices (IEDs)).
3 Evan Perez & Pervaiz Shallwani, FBI Says Devices Suggest Expertise, wall sT. J., Apr. 26, 2013, available at http://
RQOLQHZVMFRPDUWLFOH6%KWPOUHIHUULQJWRDQXQFODVVLÀHGUHSRUWE\
the Federal Bureau of  Investigation (FBI) and suggesting that the Tsarnaev brothers may have had training in how to 
build an explosive device).
4 See mass. gen. laws annFK:HVWGHWDLOLQJ0DVVDFKXVHWWVÀUHZRUNVODZVDQGUHJXODWLRQV
PDQGDWLQJWKDWÀUHZRUNVFDQQRWEHVROGWRSRVVHVVHGE\RUH[SORGHGE\FLWL]HQVLQ0DVVDFKXVHWWV
5 See Dewey, supra note 2 (noting that DHS knew about pressure cooker bombs based on past uses).
6 See id. (describing past uses of  IEDs to illustrate the potential level of  destruction pressure cooker IEDs can incur).
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tronic components including, but not limited to, digital watches, garage door openers, cell phones 
or pagers,”7 which are more easily obtainable items.  Because pressure cookers are still viewed as a 
common kitchen device, no U.S. security agency monitors them.
Fertilizer, another commonly purchased material, has also been used to create explosive devices.  
Probably the most well-known example of  the use of  fertilizer in an explosive device is the Okla-
homa City Bombing.  On April 19, 1995, Timothy McVeigh parked a rented truck in front of the 
Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City, Oklahoma.8  Inside the van McVeigh loaded 
a mixture that included more than 2,000 pounds of  ammonium-nitrate fertilizer that he purchased 
from a farm goods store in Kansas and over 1,000 pounds of  diesel fuel.9  The blast killed 168 
people, injured over 680 others, destroyed or damaged 324 buildings within a sixteen-block radius, 
and caused more than $652 million in damages.10  McVeigh and his accomplice, Terry Nichols, built 
the bomb for about $5,000 using mostly common household materials that they either purchased 
legally or stole.11 
The Boston Bombings and the Oklahoma City Bombing show that common materials such as 
IHUWLOL]HUSUHVVXUHFRRNHUVGLHVHOIXHODQGÀUHZRUNVFDQEHSXUFKDVHGHDVLO\RIWHQZLWKRXWDQ\UHJX-
lation, and at a small cost.  This Article argues that the government may be able to further regulate 
some common household items that are used for deadly purposes.  Regulating such materials could 
PDNHLWPRUHGLIÀFXOWIRUSURVSHFWLYHWHUURULVWVWRFUHDWHERPEVXVLQJWKHVHHYHU\GD\PDWHULDOVWKDW
nearly anyone can purchase.  In order to prevent future acts of  terrorism of  this nature, the govern-
ment should create a more stringent oversight program regarding the purchase of  select dangerous 
materials, especially of  those materials that are intrinsically deadly.  However, the government should 
only regulate the most deadly items because the government must balance its obligation to regulate 
deadly materials with its obligation to maintain individual liberties.    
Part II of  this Article discusses the federal intelligence community’s12 regulation of  common ma-
WHULDOVXVHGIRUGHDGO\SXUSRVHVZLWKDIRFXVRQÀUHZRUNVIHUWLOL]HUDQGSUHVVXUHFRRNHUV,WDGGL-
tionally discusses the intelligence community’s use of  data mining, focusing on how the government 
takes information from private companies on retail records and uses that data to formulate patterns, 
and the privacy concerns that such oversight invokes.  Part III suggests that the intelligence commu-
7 Id. (citing Information Bulletin, Potential Terrorist Use of  Pressure Cookers, u.s. dep’T of homeland sec. (2013)).
8 See Terror Hits Home:  The Oklahoma City Bombing, fed. bureau of invesTigaTion, http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/
history/famous-cases/oklahoma-city-bombing (last visited July 15, 2013) (detailing the destruction caused by the 
fertilizer bomb used in the Oklahoma City Bombing).
9 See Charles C. Sinnard, Growing Crime:  The Rising Use of  Fertilizer For Illegal Purposes and the Need for Stricter Regulations 
Concerning its Sale and Storage, 4 drake J. agric. l. 505, 510 (1999) (explaining how the fertilizer used in the bomb was 
purchased legally).
10 See Alan Calnan & Andrew E. Taslitz, Defusing Bomb-Blast Terrorism:  A Legal Survey of  Technological and Regulatory 
Alternatives, 67 Tenn. l. rev. 177, 181 (1999) (discussing other terrorist bombings claiming the lives of  U.S. citizens over 
WKHSDVWÀIW\\HDUV
11 See generally United States v. McVeigh, 153 F.3d 1166, 1177 (10th Cir. 1998) cert. denied, 526 U.S. 1007 (1999) 
(describing the charges against Oklahoma City bomber Timothy McVeigh). See generally United States v. McVeigh, 153 
F.3d 1166, 1177 (10th Cir. 1998) cert. denied, 526 U.S. 1007 (1999) (describing the charges against Oklahoma City bomber 
Timothy McVeigh).
12 This Article focuses on the law enforcement members of  the federal government who have a hand in monitoring 
terrorism, such as the DHS, FBI, and the Bureau of  Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms (ATF).
nity should only regulate the most dangerous items, such as certain kinds of  fertilizer and explosives. 
Finally, Part IV concludes that the intelligence community cannot regulate everything, so the govern-
ment should only regulate the materials that pose the greatest risk in a manner that does not violate 
the privacy rights of  U.S. citizens, such as recommended in Part III. 
II. u.s. inTelligence communiTy’s regulaTion and moniToring of common maTerials 
used for deadly purposes 
&XUUHQWO\JRYHUQPHQWVHFXULW\DJHQFLHVPRQLWRUVRPHW\SHVRI ÀUHZRUNVDQGIHUWLOL]HUV13  Pres-
sure cookers, on the other hand, are merely monitored by consumer organizations for safety stan-
dards.14+HUHWKHUHJXODWLRQRI ÀUHZRUNVIHUWLOL]HUDQGSUHVVXUHFRRNHUVLVGLVFXVVHG
A. Fireworks
Congress passed the Federal Explosives Law (FEL)15 in 1970 as part of  the Organized Crime 
Control Act.16  FEL applies at nearly every stage in the life of  an explosive, including importation, 
manufacture, purchase, use, or storage of  explosive materials.17  FEL also “establishes licensing and 
permit restrictions for buyers, sellers and users of  explosives,” and “prohibits the sale or distribution 
of  explosives to unauthorized persons and unauthorized locations.”18  More recently, the Safe Ex-
plosives Act19 updated these regulations.  The Safe Explosives Act requires licensees and permitees 
to keep records of  explosives sold.20  These records must include documentation of  importation, 
production, shipment, receipt, or sale of  explosive materials.21 
According to the Safe Explosives Act, licensed dealers must take physical inventories of  all their 
explosive materials, and keep track of them in accurate record form.22  Additionally, in a separate re-
13 See generally Federal Explosives Law, 18 U.S.C. §§ 841–848 (2012); see also Exec. Order No. 13284, 68 Fed. Reg. 4075 
(Jan. 23, 2003) (creating DHS to monitor terrorism domestically and internationally); Homeland Security Act (HSA) of  
3XE/1R²E$&6WDW²FRGLÀHGDW86&VWDWLQJ
the mission of  DHS: “to prevent terrorist attacks within the United States, reduce the vulnerability of  the United States 
to terrorism; and minimize the damage, and assist in the recovery, from terrorist attacks that do occur within the United 
States”).
14 See Dewey, supra note 2.
15 Federal Explosives Law, 18 U.S.C. §§ 841–848 (describing the legality of  the importation, manufacturing, 
distribution, and storage of  explosive materials).
16 18 U.S.C. § 1962 (2012).
17 See Calnan & Taslitz, supra note 10, at 192 (explaining that the regulation at all levels of  the life span of  an explosive 
is an improvement from the Federal Explosives Law’s predecessor).
18 See id.
19 27 C.F.R. § 555.121 (2013). 
20 See id.DUHTXLULQJUHFRUGVWREHNHSWIRUÀYH\HDUVRUXQWLOWKHEXVLQHVVFORVHV
21 See id. § 555.121(c) (granting the Bureau of  Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms authorization to implement provisions 
of  the law); see generally 27 C.F.R. ch. II (2013); see also Explosives Industry, bureau of alcohol, Tobacco, and firearms, 
http://www.atf.gov/content/Explosives/explosives-industry (last visited July 15, 2013) (designating what the ATF 
UHJXODWHVDQGHQIRUFHVLQFOXGLQJG\QDPLWHLJQLWHUVDQGÀUHZRUNV
22 See Safe Explosives Act, § 555.124(a) (“Each licensed dealer shall take true and accurate physical inventories . . . .”).
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tronic components including, but not limited to, digital watches, garage door openers, cell phones 
or pagers,”7 which are more easily obtainable items.  Because pressure cookers are still viewed as a 
common kitchen device, no U.S. security agency monitors them.
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Probably the most well-known example of  the use of  fertilizer in an explosive device is the Okla-
homa City Bombing.  On April 19, 1995, Timothy McVeigh parked a rented truck in front of the 
Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City, Oklahoma.8  Inside the van McVeigh loaded 
a mixture that included more than 2,000 pounds of  ammonium-nitrate fertilizer that he purchased 
from a farm goods store in Kansas and over 1,000 pounds of  diesel fuel.9  The blast killed 168 
people, injured over 680 others, destroyed or damaged 324 buildings within a sixteen-block radius, 
and caused more than $652 million in damages.10  McVeigh and his accomplice, Terry Nichols, built 
the bomb for about $5,000 using mostly common household materials that they either purchased 
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IHUWLOL]HUSUHVVXUHFRRNHUVGLHVHOIXHODQGÀUHZRUNVFDQEHSXUFKDVHGHDVLO\RIWHQZLWKRXWDQ\UHJX-
lation, and at a small cost.  This Article argues that the government may be able to further regulate 
some common household items that are used for deadly purposes.  Regulating such materials could 
PDNHLWPRUHGLIÀFXOWIRUSURVSHFWLYHWHUURULVWVWRFUHDWHERPEVXVLQJWKHVHHYHU\GD\PDWHULDOVWKDW
nearly anyone can purchase.  In order to prevent future acts of  terrorism of  this nature, the govern-
ment should create a more stringent oversight program regarding the purchase of  select dangerous 
materials, especially of  those materials that are intrinsically deadly.  However, the government should 
only regulate the most deadly items because the government must balance its obligation to regulate 
deadly materials with its obligation to maintain individual liberties.    
Part II of  this Article discusses the federal intelligence community’s12 regulation of  common ma-
WHULDOVXVHGIRUGHDGO\SXUSRVHVZLWKDIRFXVRQÀUHZRUNVIHUWLOL]HUDQGSUHVVXUHFRRNHUV,WDGGL-
tionally discusses the intelligence community’s use of  data mining, focusing on how the government 
takes information from private companies on retail records and uses that data to formulate patterns, 
and the privacy concerns that such oversight invokes.  Part III suggests that the intelligence commu-
7 Id. (citing Information Bulletin, Potential Terrorist Use of  Pressure Cookers, u.s. dep’T of homeland sec. (2013)).
8 See Terror Hits Home:  The Oklahoma City Bombing, fed. bureau of invesTigaTion, http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/
history/famous-cases/oklahoma-city-bombing (last visited July 15, 2013) (detailing the destruction caused by the 
fertilizer bomb used in the Oklahoma City Bombing).
9 See Charles C. Sinnard, Growing Crime:  The Rising Use of  Fertilizer For Illegal Purposes and the Need for Stricter Regulations 
Concerning its Sale and Storage, 4 drake J. agric. l. 505, 510 (1999) (explaining how the fertilizer used in the bomb was 
purchased legally).
10 See Alan Calnan & Andrew E. Taslitz, Defusing Bomb-Blast Terrorism:  A Legal Survey of  Technological and Regulatory 
Alternatives, 67 Tenn. l. rev. 177, 181 (1999) (discussing other terrorist bombings claiming the lives of  U.S. citizens over 
WKHSDVWÀIW\\HDUV
11 See generally United States v. McVeigh, 153 F.3d 1166, 1177 (10th Cir. 1998) cert. denied, 526 U.S. 1007 (1999) 
(describing the charges against Oklahoma City bomber Timothy McVeigh). See generally United States v. McVeigh, 153 
F.3d 1166, 1177 (10th Cir. 1998) cert. denied, 526 U.S. 1007 (1999) (describing the charges against Oklahoma City bomber 
Timothy McVeigh).
12 This Article focuses on the law enforcement members of  the federal government who have a hand in monitoring 
terrorism, such as the DHS, FBI, and the Bureau of  Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms (ATF).
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dards.14+HUHWKHUHJXODWLRQRI ÀUHZRUNVIHUWLOL]HUDQGSUHVVXUHFRRNHUVLVGLVFXVVHG
A. Fireworks
Congress passed the Federal Explosives Law (FEL)15 in 1970 as part of  the Organized Crime 
Control Act.16  FEL applies at nearly every stage in the life of  an explosive, including importation, 
manufacture, purchase, use, or storage of  explosive materials.17  FEL also “establishes licensing and 
permit restrictions for buyers, sellers and users of  explosives,” and “prohibits the sale or distribution 
of  explosives to unauthorized persons and unauthorized locations.”18  More recently, the Safe Ex-
plosives Act19 updated these regulations.  The Safe Explosives Act requires licensees and permitees 
to keep records of  explosives sold.20  These records must include documentation of  importation, 
production, shipment, receipt, or sale of  explosive materials.21 
According to the Safe Explosives Act, licensed dealers must take physical inventories of  all their 
explosive materials, and keep track of them in accurate record form.22  Additionally, in a separate re-
13 See generally Federal Explosives Law, 18 U.S.C. §§ 841–848 (2012); see also Exec. Order No. 13284, 68 Fed. Reg. 4075 
(Jan. 23, 2003) (creating DHS to monitor terrorism domestically and internationally); Homeland Security Act (HSA) of  
3XE/1R²E$&6WDW²FRGLÀHGDW86&VWDWLQJ
the mission of  DHS: “to prevent terrorist attacks within the United States, reduce the vulnerability of  the United States 
to terrorism; and minimize the damage, and assist in the recovery, from terrorist attacks that do occur within the United 
States”).
14 See Dewey, supra note 2.
15 Federal Explosives Law, 18 U.S.C. §§ 841–848 (describing the legality of  the importation, manufacturing, 
distribution, and storage of  explosive materials).
16 18 U.S.C. § 1962 (2012).
17 See Calnan & Taslitz, supra note 10, at 192 (explaining that the regulation at all levels of  the life span of  an explosive 
is an improvement from the Federal Explosives Law’s predecessor).
18 See id.
19 27 C.F.R. § 555.121 (2013). 
20 See id.DUHTXLULQJUHFRUGVWREHNHSWIRUÀYH\HDUVRUXQWLOWKHEXVLQHVVFORVHV
21 See id. § 555.121(c) (granting the Bureau of  Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms authorization to implement provisions 
of  the law); see generally 27 C.F.R. ch. II (2013); see also Explosives Industry, bureau of alcohol, Tobacco, and firearms, 
http://www.atf.gov/content/Explosives/explosives-industry (last visited July 15, 2013) (designating what the ATF 
UHJXODWHVDQGHQIRUFHVLQFOXGLQJG\QDPLWHLJQLWHUVDQGÀUHZRUNV
22 See Safe Explosives Act, § 555.124(a) (“Each licensed dealer shall take true and accurate physical inventories . . . .”).
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cord, the dealers are required to record the following information regarding purchases: date, name or 
EUDQGRI H[SORVLYHPDQXIDFWXUHU·VPDUNVRI LGHQWLÀFDWLRQTXDQWLW\GHVFULSWLRQDQGQDPHDGGUHVV
and license or permit number of  the person buying the materials.23  These rules do not apply to 
gasoline, fertilizer, or industrial and laboratory chemicals,24WKRXJKWKH\GRDSSO\WRÀUHZRUNV:KLOH
these records must be available at all times for an ATF inspector,25 there is no central database or 
record keeper who keeps track of  these purchases systematically or with any regularity.  Rather, the 
UHFRUGVDUHNHSWLQZKDWHYHUPDQQHUWKHGHDOHUVHHVÀW26 for the purpose of  being available should 
an ATF inspector ask for them, which usually only occurs post-disaster.  The laws also restrict who 
can deal and purchase explosive materials.  People under indictment or convicted of  a crime punish-
able for a term in prison over one year, fugitives, unlawful users of  controlled substances, people 
adjudicated a mentally defective or committed to a mental institution, aliens, people dishonorably 
discharged from the armed forces, or people whose citizenships have been renounced are not al-






SDUWEHFDXVHFRQVXPHUÀUHZRUNVDUHGHVLJQHGWREXUQQRWH[SORGH29  Each state has different rules 
RQWKHVDOHRI FRQVXPHUÀUHZRUNVVRPHEDQQLQJWKHSXUFKDVHRI VXFKPDWHULDOVDOWRJHWKHU30  
The U.S. Consumer Product Safety Commission (CPSC) and the U.S. Department of  Transpor-
WDWLRQ'27DOVRSOD\DUROHLQWKHRYHUVLJKWRI FRQVXPHUÀUHZRUNV31  The CPSC has enforcement 
power under the Federal Hazardous Substances Act.32  The main purpose of  the CPSC’s regulations 
is to maintain consumer safety.  Thus, these regulations limit the levels of  pyrotechnic material in 
23 See id. § 555.124(b)(1)–(6) (dealers must enter the necessary information before the close of  the next business day).
24 See id. § 555.141(a)(8).
25 See id.E $́7)RIÀFHUVPD\HQWHUWKHSUHPLVHVRI DQ\OLFHQVHHRUKROGHURI DXVHUSHUPLWIRUWKH
purpose of  examining or inspecting any record or document required.”).
26 See 18 U.S.C. § 842(f) (2006) (detailing what records are required for licensees and permitees of  explosives, and 
allowing, but not requiring, computerized records of  purchases).
27 Safe Explosives Act § 555.26.
28 Id. § 555.11.
29 Press Release, Am. Pyrotechnics Ass’n, American Pyrotechnics Associtation Offers Information Regarding 
Fireworks Devices Implicated in Boston Bombing Investigation (Apr. 25, 2013), available at http://www.prnewswire.
FRPQHZVUHOHDVHVDPHULFDQS\URWHFKQLFVDVVRFLDWLRQRIIHUVLQIRUPDWLRQUHJDUGLQJÀUHZRUNVGHYLFHVLPSOLFDWHGLQ
boston-bombing-investigation-204782871.html.
30 See e.g., mass. gen. laws annFK:HVWEDQQLQJDOOFRQVXPHUÀUHZRUNVLQ0DVVDFKXVHWWVu.s. 
fireworksKWWSZZZXVÀUHZRUNVEL]OHJDORNKWPODVWYLVLWHG-XO\DOORZLQJFHUWDLQW\SHVRI FRQVXPHU
ÀUHZRUNVZLWKGLVWULFWDSSURYDOLQ2NODKRPDAre Fireworks Legal in Your State?, usa.gov, http://blog.usa.gov/
SRVWDUHÀUHZRUNVOHJDOLQ\RXUVWDWHODVWYLVLWHG-XO\SHUPLWWLQJRQO\WKHXVHRI VSDUNOHUVLQ
Vermont). 
31 See Press Release, Am. Pyrotechnics Ass’n, supra note 29 (stating that the CPSC and the DOT are the primary 
IHGHUDODJHQFLHVZLWKRYHUVLJKWRI FRQVXPHUÀUHZRUNV
32 Federal Hazardous Substances Act (FHSA), 15 U.S.C. § 1261 (2012).
FRQVXPHUÀUHZRUNV33 in addition to ensuring that devices pass safety tests before they can be sold, 
and that they are labeled correctly. 
7KH%RVWRQ%RPELQJVVXVSHFWVPD\KDYHXVHGÀUHZRUNVWRFUHDWHWKHERPEVWKDWH[SORGHGDW
the Boston Marathon.34$XWKRULWLHVVD\WKDW7DPHUODQ7VDUQDHYSXUFKDVHGÀUHZRUNVIURPDVWRUH
in New Hampshire, paying over $400 in cash for two “lock and load” reloadable mortar kits, which 
each contains four tubes and twenty-four shells.35  Per regulation, the store recorded the name and 
driver’s license number of  each customer who purchased items, enabling the authorities to track 
down Tsarnaev’s purchase.36+RZHYHUWKHW\SHVRI ÀUHZRUNVSXUFKDVHGE\7VDUQDHYFRQWDLQWUDFH
amounts of  explosive material that is meant to burn rather than to detonate.37  Both the ATF and 
WKH$PHULFDQ3\URWHFKQLFV$VVRFLDWLRQ$3$VD\WKDWFRQVXPHUÀUHZRUNVKDYHUDUHO\EHHQXVHGIRU
such destructive purposes.38  Fireworks were almost certainly not the primary source of  the explo-
sions at the Boston Marathon.  The type and scale of  destruction at the Boston Marathon almost 
FHUWDLQO\FRXOGQRWKDYHEHHQFDXVHGE\VXFKVPDOODPRXQWVRI H[SORVLYHVDVLQWKHÀUHZRUNV7VDU-
naev purchased.397KH$3$EHOLHYHVWKDWWKHLQYHVWLJDWLRQZLOOÀQGWKDWRWKHUPDWHULDOVZHUHWKH
cause of  the deadly explosions.40%DVHGRQWKLVLQIRUPDWLRQWKHWKUHDWSRVHGE\FRQVXPHUÀUH-
works for terrorist purposes seems miniscule and the ATF regulations and state laws do an effective 




Fertilizer, ordinarily used for farming or gardening, can also be converted into a deadly explo-
sive.  Urea-nitrate and ammonium-nitrate fertilizer can be turned into a bomb by merely adding fuel 
oil and a detonator.41  Anyone can go to a farm supply or garden store and purchase multiple bags 
of  fertilizer.  It is not unusual for someone involved in agriculture or even an ordinary person to buy 
large amounts of  fertilizer.  Ammonium-nitrate fertilizer is not included within the meaning of  an 
33 See &)5OLPLWLQJÀUHFUDFNHUVWRÀIW\PLOOLJUDPVRI S\URWHFKQLFSRZGHUIRUJURXQGGHYLFHV
and 130 milligrams for aerial devices).
34 See Holly Ramer & Lynne Tuohy, NH Store: Boston Bombing Suspect Bought Fireworks, huffingTon posT, Apr. 23, 
2013, available atKWWSZZZKXIÀQJWRQSRVWFRPERVWRQERPELQJVXVSHFWÀUHZRUNVBQBKWPO
UHSRUWLQJWKDWWKHROGHU7VDUQDHYEURWKHUERXJKWH[SORVLYHVLQD1HZ+DPSVKLUHÀUHZRUNVVWRUHWKDWPD\KDYHEHHQ
used in the creation of  the Boston Marathon bombs).
35 Id. 
36 Id. 
37 See Press Release, Am. Pyrotechnics Ass’n, supraQRWHGHWDLOLQJWKHVSHFLÀFÀUHZRUNVSXUFKDVHGFRQWDLQHGRQO\
sixty grams, or two ounces of  explosives per shell, with a total of  forty eight shells purchased).
38 See id.
39 See id.VXJJHVWLQJWKDWFRQVXPHUÀUHZRUNVDUHUDUHO\XVHGIRUGHVWUXFWLYHSXUSRVHVEHFDXVHWKHUHDUHPDQ\DOWHUQDWH
materials that are easily available with the capability of  causing much more damage).
40  See id.
41 See Calnan & Taslitz, supra note 10, at 181–82 (explaining that urea-nitrate fertilizer was used for the World Trade 
Center bombing in 1993, ammonium-nitrate fertilizer was used for the Oklahoma City bombing in 1995, and suggesting 
that those with little technical knowledge can easily and cheaply obtain the necessary materials to create a powerful 
bomb).
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cord, the dealers are required to record the following information regarding purchases: date, name or 
EUDQGRI H[SORVLYHPDQXIDFWXUHU·VPDUNVRI LGHQWLÀFDWLRQTXDQWLW\GHVFULSWLRQDQGQDPHDGGUHVV
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23 See id. § 555.124(b)(1)–(6) (dealers must enter the necessary information before the close of  the next business day).
24 See id. § 555.141(a)(8).
25 See id.E $́7)RIÀFHUVPD\HQWHUWKHSUHPLVHVRI DQ\OLFHQVHHRUKROGHURI DXVHUSHUPLWIRUWKH
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26 See 18 U.S.C. § 842(f) (2006) (detailing what records are required for licensees and permitees of  explosives, and 
allowing, but not requiring, computerized records of  purchases).
27 Safe Explosives Act § 555.26.
28 Id. § 555.11.
29 Press Release, Am. Pyrotechnics Ass’n, American Pyrotechnics Associtation Offers Information Regarding 
Fireworks Devices Implicated in Boston Bombing Investigation (Apr. 25, 2013), available at http://www.prnewswire.
FRPQHZVUHOHDVHVDPHULFDQS\URWHFKQLFVDVVRFLDWLRQRIIHUVLQIRUPDWLRQUHJDUGLQJÀUHZRUNVGHYLFHVLPSOLFDWHGLQ
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ODVWYLVLWHG-XO\SHUPLWWLQJRQO\WKHXVHRI VSDUNOHUVLQ
Vermont). 
31 See Press Release, Am. Pyrotechnics Ass’n, supra note 29 (stating that the CPSC and the DOT are the primary 
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
32 Federal Hazardous Substances Act (FHSA), 15 U.S.C. § 1261 (2012).
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explosive under the Federal Explosives Law.42  Thus, ATF rules and regulations do not govern fertil-
izer.  Instead, the Environmental Protection Agency and the Department of Agriculture regulate 
fertilizer as a common product with an eye towards its potential effects on the environment,43 not its 
use in explosives. 
After 9/11, Congress enacted a law requiring plants using or storing high-risk chemicals such as 
DPPRQLXPQLWUDWHWRÀOHUHSRUWVZLWK'+6LQRUGHUWRLQFUHDVHVHFXULW\44  Additionally, some states 
require vendors of  commercial grade fertilizer to register with the state.45  But there are no federal 
regulations regarding the sales of  such materials.46  Most regulations occur at the manufacturing 
and distribution level.47  At the federal level, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) regulates 
fertilizer to ensure safe water and conservation practices,48 the DOT regulates the transportation of  
fertilizer as a hazardous material,49 but “[w]hat is missing is any regulation from the Department of  
Agriculture concerning the purchase and safety from theft of  either anhydrous ammonia or ammo-
nium nitrate.”50  Any further regulation or monitoring is done on a local level.  
Almost anyone can purchase commercial grade fertilizer. 51  Some states require a seller of  such 
PDWHULDOVWRUHFRUGEX\HUV·GULYHU·VOLFHQVHLQIRUPDWLRQVLPLODUWRWKHÀUHZRUNVUHJXODWLRQVDQG
UHTXLUHWKHYHQGRUWRNHHSWKHLQIRUPDWLRQRQÀOH52  “Fortunately, many local law enforcement 
agencies maintain amicable relationships with shopkeepers who will inform the police of  a person 
they are unfamiliar with buying large amounts of  commercial grade fertilizer.”53  But this system is 
obviously not comprehensive.  Rather, the monitoring is wholly dependent on the alertness of  the 
shopkeepers and also on whether or not the shopkeepers actually make the call to the police. 
Because fertilizer creates an effective explosive when combined with few other common prod-
ucts, it has been used for deadly purposes multiple times in the past.  For example, in February 1993, 
DWUXFNERPEÀOOHGZLWKSRXQGVRI XUHDQLWUDWHIHUWLOL]HUH[SORGHGXQGHUQHDWKWKH1RUWK
42 See 27 C.F.R. § 555.141 (2013) (discussing the materials that are exempted from the Federal Explosives Law). 
43 See generally 40 C.F.R. §§ 257, 264, 266, 268 (2013) (detailing proper methods for disposal of  fertilizer and other 
guidelines to ensure minimum environmental contamination).
44 See Manny Fernandez & Steven Greenhouse, Texas Fertilizer Plant Fell Through Regulatory Cracks, n.y. Times, Apr. 
24, 2013, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2013/04/25/us/texas-fertilizer-plant-fell-through-cracks-of-regulatory-
oversight.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0 (explaining how the West Fertilizer plant in Texas, where a non-criminal, deadly 
explosion occurred in May 2013, managed to evade the necessary reporting standards despite storing large amounts of  
dangerous fertilizer).
45 See Adam Shiner, Materials for Fertilizer Bombs Not Regulated, homeland sec. news wire, Jan. 14, 2011, available at 
http://www.homelandsecuritynewswire.com/materials-fertilizer-bombs-not-regulated (discussing the ease with which 
people are able to purchase materials that can be used to create dangerous explosive devices).
46 See id. (“While some states do choose to exercise their regulatory powers, laws can differ greatly from state to state, 
and some states do not have any regulation.”).
47 See Sinnard, supra note 9, at 515.
48 See id.; 40 C.F.R. § 418.70 (1998) (laying out the Environmental Protection Agency’s role in regulating fertilizer). 
49 See 49 C.F.R. § 176.415 (1998) (proscribing the requirements for transporting ammonium- nitrates and certain 
ammonium-nitrate fertilizers).
50 Sinnard, supra note 9, at 515.
51 See Shiner, supra note 45.
52 See id.
53 Id.
Tower of  the World Trade Center in New York City, killing six people.54  Two years later, a similar 
device destroyed the Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City.55  The power of  these explosions 
shows that certain types of  fertilizers are extremely prone to use for dangerous purposes, so further 
regulation and monitoring of  certain kinds of  fertilizer may be necessary to prevent future acts of  
terrorism.
C. Pressure Cookers
The intelligence community does not currently regulate pressure cookers.  The only rules con-
cerning pressure cookers are from agencies that govern consumer safety.56  Though DHS is aware 
that terrorists used pressure cookers to create IEDs before the Boston Bombings, it has not taken 
any steps towards regulation of  this common kitchen appliance.57  It is unclear if  DHS will take such 
action in the wake of  the Boston Bombing.
 
D. Data Mining of Retail Records for Common Materials
7KHJRYHUQPHQWXVHVGDWDPLQLQJWRFROOHFWGDWDRQFRQVXPHUV·SXUFKDVHVRI ÀUHZRUNVIHU-
tilizer, pressure cookers, and other ordinary items that can be turned into deadly weapons.  Data 
mining is “the application of  database technology and techniques—such as statistical analysis and 
modeling—to uncover hidden patterns and subtle relationships in data and to infer rules that allow 
for the prediction of  future results.”58  Due to the development of  high-speed computers and new 
technology, gathering and sorting vast amounts of  data has become easier over time.  Data mining is 
not a new phenomenon.  It has been used in the private sector for marketing, supply chain analysis, 
DQGÀQDQFLDODQDO\VLVIRU\HDUV59  However, the government’s use of  data mining for counterterror-
ism purposes is a more recent trend.
There are several types of  data mining: pattern-based, subject-based, and risk-assessment.  
3DWWHUQEDVHGGDWDPLQLQJVHHNVWRÀQGSDWWHUQVLQGDWDQRWVSHFLÀFWRDQ\LQGLYLGXDOEXWUDWKHUWR
trends found in data.60  Subject-based data mining is the search for information about a particular 
54 World Trade Center 1993 Bombing:  NYC Marks 20th Anniversary of  Terrorist Attack, huffingTon posT (Feb. 26, 2013), 
KWWSZZZKXIÀQJWRQSRVWFRPZRUOGWUDGHFHQWHUERPELQJWKDQQLYHUVDU\SKRWRVQHZ\RUN
FLW\WHUURULVPBQBKWPOUHÁHFWLQJRQWKHDQQLYHUVDU\RI WKH:RUOG7UDGH&HQWHUERPELQJ
55 Id. (noting that the World Trade Center bombing was in 1993); see also Fernandez & Greenhouse, supra note 44 
(looking at the explosion at the West Fertilizer Plant in West, Texas in April 2013, as a further example of  failure to 
regulate ammonium-nitrate fertilizer, and discussing how, under the regulations implementing the Emergency Planning 
and Community Right-to-Know Act (EPCRA), 40 C.F.R. § 350–372 (1988), the plant sent an annual report to local 
DJHQFLHVZLWKGHWDLOVRI WKHKD]DUGRXVFKHPLFDOVVWRUHGWKHUHEXWWKHORFDORIÀFLDOVIDLOHGWRÀOHLWZLWK'+6
56 See Dewey, supra note 2 (claiming that pressure cookers are often not searched when being brought into the United 
States).
57 See id. (explaining that DHS has been on alert about pressure cooker bombs for years).
58 u.s. gov’T accounTabiliTy office, GAO-04-548, daTa mining:  federal efforTs cover a wide range of uses, 
4 (2004) (hereinafter Data Mining).
59 See id. (describing how the use and sophistication of  data mining has increased over time).
60 Id.
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24, 2013, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2013/04/25/us/texas-fertilizer-plant-fell-through-cracks-of-regulatory-
oversight.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0 (explaining how the West Fertilizer plant in Texas, where a non-criminal, deadly 
explosion occurred in May 2013, managed to evade the necessary reporting standards despite storing large amounts of  
dangerous fertilizer).
45 See Adam Shiner, Materials for Fertilizer Bombs Not Regulated, homeland sec. news wire, Jan. 14, 2011, available at 
http://www.homelandsecuritynewswire.com/materials-fertilizer-bombs-not-regulated (discussing the ease with which 
people are able to purchase materials that can be used to create dangerous explosive devices).
46 See id. (“While some states do choose to exercise their regulatory powers, laws can differ greatly from state to state, 
and some states do not have any regulation.”).
47 See Sinnard, supra note 9, at 515.
48 See id.; 40 C.F.R. § 418.70 (1998) (laying out the Environmental Protection Agency’s role in regulating fertilizer). 
49 See 49 C.F.R. § 176.415 (1998) (proscribing the requirements for transporting ammonium- nitrates and certain 
ammonium-nitrate fertilizers).
50 Sinnard, supra note 9, at 515.
51 See Shiner, supra note 45.
52 See id.
53 Id.
Tower of  the World Trade Center in New York City, killing six people.54  Two years later, a similar 
device destroyed the Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City.55  The power of  these explosions 
shows that certain types of  fertilizers are extremely prone to use for dangerous purposes, so further 
regulation and monitoring of  certain kinds of  fertilizer may be necessary to prevent future acts of  
terrorism.
C. Pressure Cookers
The intelligence community does not currently regulate pressure cookers.  The only rules con-
cerning pressure cookers are from agencies that govern consumer safety.56  Though DHS is aware 
that terrorists used pressure cookers to create IEDs before the Boston Bombings, it has not taken 
any steps towards regulation of  this common kitchen appliance.57  It is unclear if  DHS will take such 
action in the wake of  the Boston Bombing.
 
D. Data Mining of Retail Records for Common Materials
7KHJRYHUQPHQWXVHVGDWDPLQLQJWRFROOHFWGDWDRQFRQVXPHUV·SXUFKDVHVRI ÀUHZRUNVIHU-
tilizer, pressure cookers, and other ordinary items that can be turned into deadly weapons.  Data 
mining is “the application of  database technology and techniques—such as statistical analysis and 
modeling—to uncover hidden patterns and subtle relationships in data and to infer rules that allow 
for the prediction of  future results.”58  Due to the development of  high-speed computers and new 
technology, gathering and sorting vast amounts of  data has become easier over time.  Data mining is 
not a new phenomenon.  It has been used in the private sector for marketing, supply chain analysis, 
DQGÀQDQFLDODQDO\VLVIRU\HDUV59  However, the government’s use of  data mining for counterterror-
ism purposes is a more recent trend.
There are several types of  data mining: pattern-based, subject-based, and risk-assessment.  
3DWWHUQEDVHGGDWDPLQLQJVHHNVWRÀQGSDWWHUQVLQGDWDQRWVSHFLÀFWRDQ\LQGLYLGXDOEXWUDWKHUWR
trends found in data.60  Subject-based data mining is the search for information about a particular 
54 World Trade Center 1993 Bombing:  NYC Marks 20th Anniversary of  Terrorist Attack, huffingTon posT (Feb. 26, 2013), 
KWWSZZZKXIÀQJWRQSRVWFRPZRUOGWUDGHFHQWHUERPELQJWKDQQLYHUVDU\SKRWRVQHZ\RUN
FLW\WHUURULVPBQBKWPOUHÁHFWLQJRQWKHDQQLYHUVDU\RI WKH:RUOG7UDGH&HQWHUERPELQJ
55 Id. (noting that the World Trade Center bombing was in 1993); see also Fernandez & Greenhouse, supra note 44 
(looking at the explosion at the West Fertilizer Plant in West, Texas in April 2013, as a further example of  failure to 
regulate ammonium-nitrate fertilizer, and discussing how, under the regulations implementing the Emergency Planning 
and Community Right-to-Know Act (EPCRA), 40 C.F.R. § 350–372 (1988), the plant sent an annual report to local 
DJHQFLHVZLWKGHWDLOVRI WKHKD]DUGRXVFKHPLFDOVVWRUHGWKHUHEXWWKHORFDORIÀFLDOVIDLOHGWRÀOHLWZLWK'+6
56 See Dewey, supra note 2 (claiming that pressure cookers are often not searched when being brought into the United 
States).
57 See id. (explaining that DHS has been on alert about pressure cooker bombs for years).
58 u.s. gov’T accounTabiliTy office, GAO-04-548, daTa mining:  federal efforTs cover a wide range of uses, 
4 (2004) (hereinafter Data Mining).
59 See id. (describing how the use and sophistication of  data mining has increased over time).
60 Id.
51Common materials turned deadlyVol. 4, No. 150 NATIONAL SECURITY LAW BRIEF Vol. 4, No. 1
SHUVRQVXFKDVSKRQHUHFRUGVÀQJHUSULQWVRUFULPLQDOUHFRUGV61  Risk-assessment data mining is 
the use of  data to determine whether a particular person or transaction could pose a threat based on 
predictors from past activities.62  Here, pattern-based data mining and risk-assessment data mining 
will be discussed in the context of  their use for counterterrorism purposes.
Among the executive agencies, the Department of  Defense (DOD) has the largest number of  
data mining efforts.63  The DOD uses data mining to analyze intelligence and detect terrorist activi-
ties.64  The government collects data from both the public and private sectors,65 while private data-
bases collect commercial retail records.66  In 2002, the Attorney General Guidelines gave the FBI 
authority to engage in data mining.67  DHS also has the same permission to use data mining technol-
ogy under a grant from Congress.68  When it comes to using data mining for counterterrorism, “the 
relevant question is why an individual took a particular action, such as renting a car or purchasing 
chemicals.”69  But, “while pattern analysis can objectively identify what a person has done, and even 
say whether it is within a norm, it is far harder to attribute motivation to actions.”70  
The intelligence community utilizes data mining because it can no longer solely rely on tradition-
al methods of  intelligence gathering such as human sources to collect the wide range of  data now 
available.71  
When people think of  commercial data mining they often think of  its use for marketing cam-
paigns or online advertisements.  Commercially, data mining usually predicts customer patterns and 
allows retailers to make future recommendations to consumers based on past purchases.  However, 
this information can be useful to the intelligence community as well.  
E. Data Mining and Privacy 
More recently, retailers have started to collect personal data from consumers by tracking shop-
61 Id.
62 James X. Dempsey & Lara M. Flint, Commercial Data and National Security, 72 geo. wash. l. rev. 1459, 1460 (2004).
63 See Data Mining, supra note 58 at 3.
64 Id.
65 See id. at 5; see also Dempsey, supra note 62, at 1476 (“Especially since September 11, the FBI has obtained 
FRPPHUFLDOGDWDEDVHVIURPSULYDWHHQWLWLHVIURPJURFHU\VWRUHIUHTXHQWVKRSSLQJUHFRUGVWRVFXEDGLYLQJFHUWLÀFDWLRQ
records, without having to exercise any compulsory authority.”).
66 See Dempsey & Flint, supra note 62, at 1460 (noting that the private sector offers the government services based on 
the aggregation and analysis of  information that is available to the private sector).
67 See id. at 1468 (citing Dep’t of  Justice, Attorney General’s Guidelines on General Crimes, Racketeering Enterprise 
and Terrorism Enterprise Investigations 21–22 (May 30, 2002), available at http://www.justice.gov/ag/readingroom/
generalcrimea.htm).
68 See id. at 1469 (referencing Homeland Security Act of  2002, Pub. L. No. 107–296, § 201(d)(14), 116 Stat. 2135, 
2145–47 (2002)).
69 Id. at 1470.
70 Id.
71 mary derosa, CSIS, daTa mining and daTa analysis for counTerTerrorism 5 (2004), available at http://www.
FVLVRUJÀOHVPHGLDFVLVSXEVBGDWDBPLQLQJBUHSRUWSGI ´)RUFRXQWHUWHUURULVPZHPXVWEHDEOHWRÀQGDIHZ
small dots of  data in a sea of  information and make a picture out of  them.”).
SHUV·FHOOSKRQHVZKHQWKH\HQWHUDVSHFLÀFVWRUH72  Using the Wi-Fi signals from shoppers’ cell 
phones, retailers are able to track shoppers’ motions to gather information about shoppers’ behav-
iors and send such shoppers personal deals based on their recorded habits.73  Unsurprisingly, this 
invasion of  privacy disturbs many shoppers.74  Stores argue that this behavior is no different than 
tracking consumers’ online behavior or using cameras in stores to track shoppers’ activities.75 
There are no privacy laws stopping the government from obtaining personal information such as 
WUDYHOUHFRUGVRQOLQHDQGRIÁLQHUHWDLOSXUFKDVHVUHDOHVWDWHDQGPRUWJDJHUHFRUGVPDJD]LQHVXE-
scriptions, or utility bills.76  With commercial data such as retail records of  how many pounds of  fer-
tilizer are being purchased, the government has every right to voluntarily request data, so long as no 
statute prohibits the government’s access to the information.77  There are often exceptions to privacy 
laws carved out for law enforcement and intelligence agencies.  Thus, the request and use of  such 
retail records are perfectly legal.  Whether this permissibly shared data includes personal information 
DERXWVSHFLÀFLQGLYLGXDOEX\HUVLVTXHVWLRQDEOH
Merely because data is used commercially or is available to the public does not mean that the 
information can be used with no constraints on privacy.78  To the contrary, the Fair Credit Reporting 
Act79 and its amendment, the Fair and Accurate Credit Transactions Act of  2003,80 protect consum-
ers from disclosure of  inaccurate personal information that consumer reporting agencies collect.81  
These rules apply to commercial usage of  the data gathered, but may not apply to the government’s 
use of  such information.  Additionally, the Privacy Act of  197482 requires that agencies give the pub-
lic notice of  any personal records on an individual that an agency may have and outlines the condi-
tions for disclosure of  such records.83  But even the Privacy Act carves out an exception for records 
belonging to the FBI and other law enforcement agencies.
Because there are exceptions for law enforcement and intelligence gathering, it is questionable 
whether the government’s use of  data mining infringes upon U.S. citizens’ Fourth Amendment 
rights against unreasonable searches.84  According to the U.S. Supreme Court, searches conducted 
72 See Stephanie Clifford & Quentin Hardy, Attention, Shoppers:  Store is Tracking Your Cell, n.y. Times (July 14, 2013), 
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/15/business/attention-shopper-stores-are-tracking-your-cell.html?hp&_
r=1& (discussing the use of  cell phone tracking for data-collection in the retail realm).
73 See id. (detailing how some stores track information such as shoppers’ sex, how long they spend perusing 
merchandise, and what people are buying).
74 See id. (expressing that some consumers feel as though they are being “stalked” in the stores).
75 See id. (explaining that some cameras in stores are so sophisticated that they are able to track what exactly shoppers 
are looking at).
76 Dempsey & Flint, supra note 62, at 1476.
77 Id.
78 Id. at 1462 (“Data privacy laws thus limit the use of  widely available, and even public, information because it is 
recognized that individuals should retain some control over the use of  information about themselves and should be able 
to manage the consequences of  others’ use of  that information.”).
79 Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA), 15 U.S.C. § 1681e(b)–(d) (2006).
80 Fair & Accurate Credit Transactions Act of  2003 (FACTA), 15 U.S.C. § 1601 (2012).
81 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681e(b)–(d) (2006) (regulating accuracy of  reporting and disclosure of  consumer reports by users).
82 Privacy Act of  1974, 5 U.S.C. § 552(a) (2012).
83 Id.
84 See generally U.S. consT. amend. IV (guarding against unreasonable search and seizure).
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without warrants are unlawful, “notwithstanding facts unquestionably showing probable cause.”85  
But, the government may argue that this is a matter of  political question, and thus the courts cannot 
debate its merits.86   
Additionally, the Fourth Amendment does not protect anything a person knowingly exposes to 
the public.87  The Supreme Court has upheld the legality of  governmental use of  pen registers to 
monitor the outgoing calls of  suspects.88  And the Uniting and Strengthening America by Provid-
ing Appropriate Tools Required to Interrupt and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT) Act89 grants 
explicit permission to the government to intercept wire, oral, and electronic communications if  they 
relate to terrorism.90  It too would seem logical that one has no legitimate belief that retail records 
are kept private.  Logically, the Fourth Amendment reasoning in Smith v. Maryland should apply to re-
tail records as well.  In Smith, the court found that people should not expect numbers that are dialed 
from their telephones to be private.91  If  there is no expectation that one’s purchases are being kept 
private, then the government can scrutinize these records without a warrant.92  Likewise, under the 
USA PATRIOT Act, the government is granted permission to search such records.  Thus, because 
there is no expectation that retail records are private, and because of  the USA PATRIOT Act’s 
authority, the government’s use of  data mining with retail records does not seem to currently violate 
any federal laws on privacy.
iv. The deparTmenT of homeland securiTy should selecT only The mosT dangerous 
maTerials To moniTor and regulaTe in a non-inTrusive manner
Nearly any material can be turned into a weapon.93  But the government cannot adequately 
85 See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967) (discussing the government’s use of  electronic surveillance, 
which can be done without a warrant in special exceptions, such as when the law enforcement agency is in hot pursuit of  
a suspect).
86 See, e.g., $O$XODTLY3DQHWWD1RFY''&ÀOHG-XO\DUJXLQJIRUWKHJRYHUQPHQWWKDWWKH
use of  drone attacks overseas is a political question, and thus not for the courts to decide on its constitutionality); but see 
sTaff of dep’T of homeland sec., quadrennial homeland securiTy review reporT:  a sTraTegic framework for a 
secure homeland 2 (2010) (hereinafter Quadrennial Homeland Sec. Rev.) (“Indeed, homeland security is as much about 
protecting the American way of  life as it is about protecting this country from future attack.  Thus, a safe and secure 
homeland must mean more than preventing terrorist attacks from being carried out.  It must also ensure that the liberties 
of  all Americans are assured, privacy is protected, and the means by which we interchange with the world—through 
travel, lawful immigration, trade, commerce, and exchange—are secured.”).
87 See Katz, 389 U.S. at 351 (“But what he seeks to preserve as private, even in an area accessible to the public, may be 
constitutionally protected.”).
88 See6PLWKY0DU\ODQG86ÀQGLQJWKDWSHRSOHVKRXOGKDYHQRH[SHFWDWLRQRI SULYDF\ZLWK
numbers dialed on one’s telephone, and thus the installation of  a pen register on one’s phone without a warrant is 
MXVWLÀHGDVVXFKDQDFWLRQLVQRWDVHDUFK
89 Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (2001).
90 See id.²FRGLÀHGDW86&
91 See Smith, 442 U.S. at 746.
92 See id. (implying that since the Fourth Amendment protections do not apply to numbers dialed from a private 
phone because the phone company may record those numbers for billing purposes, the protections also should not 
apply to retail records because retail companies may use purchase information in the same manner).
93 See discussion supra Part I (e.g., the possible use of  Christmas lights in executing the Boston Bombings).
monitor every consumer purchase without turning the United States into an overbearing surveillance 
police state.94  Thus, the intelligence community should only monitor the items that pose the greatest 
threats to human safety without human tampering. 
A. What Should the Intelligence Community Monitor and Regulate?
The intelligence community should only monitor the materials that pose the biggest threat when 
they are hazardous on their own, such as certain types of  fertilizer that are combustible with no 
DGGHGSURGXFWV,WVHHPVIRROLVKWRUHJXODWHFRQVXPHUÀUHZRUNVVLQFHWKH\RQO\KROGWUDFHDPRXQWV
of  explosive materials that burn rather than explode.  As for fertilizer, the intelligence community 
should continue to monitor urea-nitrate and ammonium-nitrate based fertilizers, as both of  these 
materials are extremely hazardous when placed in the wrong hands and are easily obtainable through 
legal means.  Additionally, these types of  fertilizer are deadly even when not used with criminal 
intent, such as if  one merely stores such fertilizer in unsafe conditions.  Thus, one of  the security 
agencies within the intelligence community should continue to monitor and regulate dangerous ma-
terials such as urea-nitrate and ammonium-nitrate.
On the other hand, pressure cookers should not be regulated.  If  the intelligence community 
regulated pressure cookers, it would be impossible to draw the line with other common household 
items that have the potential to be used for deadly purposes.  For example, nails were used as shrap-
nel pieces in the Boston bombs, and Christmas lights were allegedly used as well.  If  pressure cook-
ers are monitored, it would seem that nails and Christmas lights should receive the same treatment.  
This list of  common materials would become endless because almost anything can be turned into 
a deadly weapon.  Thus, monitoring these items would create a slippery slope.  Every time a new 
common household product is used in a dangerous way, the government would have to add it to the 
list of  items to regulate and monitor in terms of  who is purchasing them.  American liberty would 
be violated if  the government regulates every item Americans purchase.  Therefore, the intelligence 
community cannot be expected to put time and resources into monitoring pressure cookers, nails, 
Christmas lights, and other similar products.  Rather, the intelligence community should alert retail-
ers that such items have potentially deadly uses so that they remain on alert for unusual consumer 
behavior.  In addition to receiving alerts from retailers, the intelligence community also could focus 
LWVGDWDPLQLQJHIIRUWVRQXQXVXDOO\KLJKYROXPHVRI SUHVVXUHFRRNHUVDOHVLQRUGHUWRÀQGSRVVLEOH
patterns of  suspicious activity.  
Additionally, with any common material that is regulated there is the issue of  determining who 
actually needs vast quantities of  such materials for legitimate purposes.  For example, if  fertilizer 
were further regulated, the intelligence community would have to make exceptions for farmers and 
gardeners who need to buy large amounts for their work or carpenters who need to buy nails in 
EXON,WZRXOGDOVREHGLIÀFXOWWRGHWHUPLQHKRZPXFKRI WKHVSHFLÀFPDWHULDOVRQHPXVWSXUFKDVH
to make that person’s activities suspicious.  Either an exception would need to be carved out for 
94 See Quadrennial Homeland Sec. Rev., supra note 86 (expressing that the Department of  Homeland Security is aware 
that it is “not possible to secure the American homeland simply with physical protections or through strategies that 
reinforce fear or isolation.”). 
53Common materials turned deadlyVol. 4, No. 152 NATIONAL SECURITY LAW BRIEF Vol. 4, No. 1
without warrants are unlawful, “notwithstanding facts unquestionably showing probable cause.”85  
But, the government may argue that this is a matter of  political question, and thus the courts cannot 
debate its merits.86   
Additionally, the Fourth Amendment does not protect anything a person knowingly exposes to 
the public.87  The Supreme Court has upheld the legality of  governmental use of  pen registers to 
monitor the outgoing calls of  suspects.88  And the Uniting and Strengthening America by Provid-
ing Appropriate Tools Required to Interrupt and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT) Act89 grants 
explicit permission to the government to intercept wire, oral, and electronic communications if  they 
relate to terrorism.90  It too would seem logical that one has no legitimate belief that retail records 
are kept private.  Logically, the Fourth Amendment reasoning in Smith v. Maryland should apply to re-
tail records as well.  In Smith, the court found that people should not expect numbers that are dialed 
from their telephones to be private.91  If  there is no expectation that one’s purchases are being kept 
private, then the government can scrutinize these records without a warrant.92  Likewise, under the 
USA PATRIOT Act, the government is granted permission to search such records.  Thus, because 
there is no expectation that retail records are private, and because of  the USA PATRIOT Act’s 
authority, the government’s use of  data mining with retail records does not seem to currently violate 
any federal laws on privacy.
iv. The deparTmenT of homeland securiTy should selecT only The mosT dangerous 
maTerials To moniTor and regulaTe in a non-inTrusive manner
Nearly any material can be turned into a weapon.93  But the government cannot adequately 
85 See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967) (discussing the government’s use of  electronic surveillance, 
which can be done without a warrant in special exceptions, such as when the law enforcement agency is in hot pursuit of  
a suspect).
86 See, e.g., $O$XODTLY3DQHWWD1RFY''&ÀOHG-XO\DUJXLQJIRUWKHJRYHUQPHQWWKDWWKH
use of  drone attacks overseas is a political question, and thus not for the courts to decide on its constitutionality); but see 
sTaff of dep’T of homeland sec., quadrennial homeland securiTy review reporT:  a sTraTegic framework for a 
secure homeland 2 (2010) (hereinafter Quadrennial Homeland Sec. Rev.) (“Indeed, homeland security is as much about 
protecting the American way of  life as it is about protecting this country from future attack.  Thus, a safe and secure 
homeland must mean more than preventing terrorist attacks from being carried out.  It must also ensure that the liberties 
of  all Americans are assured, privacy is protected, and the means by which we interchange with the world—through 
travel, lawful immigration, trade, commerce, and exchange—are secured.”).
87 See Katz, 389 U.S. at 351 (“But what he seeks to preserve as private, even in an area accessible to the public, may be 
constitutionally protected.”).
88 See6PLWKY0DU\ODQG86ÀQGLQJWKDWSHRSOHVKRXOGKDYHQRH[SHFWDWLRQRI SULYDF\ZLWK
numbers dialed on one’s telephone, and thus the installation of  a pen register on one’s phone without a warrant is 
MXVWLÀHGDVVXFKDQDFWLRQLVQRWDVHDUFK
89 Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (2001).
90 See id.²FRGLÀHGDW86&
91 See Smith, 442 U.S. at 746.
92 See id. (implying that since the Fourth Amendment protections do not apply to numbers dialed from a private 
phone because the phone company may record those numbers for billing purposes, the protections also should not 
apply to retail records because retail companies may use purchase information in the same manner).
93 See discussion supra Part I (e.g., the possible use of  Christmas lights in executing the Boston Bombings).
monitor every consumer purchase without turning the United States into an overbearing surveillance 
police state.94  Thus, the intelligence community should only monitor the items that pose the greatest 
threats to human safety without human tampering. 
A. What Should the Intelligence Community Monitor and Regulate?
The intelligence community should only monitor the materials that pose the biggest threat when 
they are hazardous on their own, such as certain types of  fertilizer that are combustible with no 
DGGHGSURGXFWV,WVHHPVIRROLVKWRUHJXODWHFRQVXPHUÀUHZRUNVVLQFHWKH\RQO\KROGWUDFHDPRXQWV
of  explosive materials that burn rather than explode.  As for fertilizer, the intelligence community 
should continue to monitor urea-nitrate and ammonium-nitrate based fertilizers, as both of  these 
materials are extremely hazardous when placed in the wrong hands and are easily obtainable through 
legal means.  Additionally, these types of  fertilizer are deadly even when not used with criminal 
intent, such as if  one merely stores such fertilizer in unsafe conditions.  Thus, one of  the security 
agencies within the intelligence community should continue to monitor and regulate dangerous ma-
terials such as urea-nitrate and ammonium-nitrate.
On the other hand, pressure cookers should not be regulated.  If  the intelligence community 
regulated pressure cookers, it would be impossible to draw the line with other common household 
items that have the potential to be used for deadly purposes.  For example, nails were used as shrap-
nel pieces in the Boston bombs, and Christmas lights were allegedly used as well.  If  pressure cook-
ers are monitored, it would seem that nails and Christmas lights should receive the same treatment.  
This list of  common materials would become endless because almost anything can be turned into 
a deadly weapon.  Thus, monitoring these items would create a slippery slope.  Every time a new 
common household product is used in a dangerous way, the government would have to add it to the 
list of  items to regulate and monitor in terms of  who is purchasing them.  American liberty would 
be violated if  the government regulates every item Americans purchase.  Therefore, the intelligence 
community cannot be expected to put time and resources into monitoring pressure cookers, nails, 
Christmas lights, and other similar products.  Rather, the intelligence community should alert retail-
ers that such items have potentially deadly uses so that they remain on alert for unusual consumer 
behavior.  In addition to receiving alerts from retailers, the intelligence community also could focus 
LWVGDWDPLQLQJHIIRUWVRQXQXVXDOO\KLJKYROXPHVRI SUHVVXUHFRRNHUVDOHVLQRUGHUWRÀQGSRVVLEOH
patterns of  suspicious activity.  
Additionally, with any common material that is regulated there is the issue of  determining who 
actually needs vast quantities of  such materials for legitimate purposes.  For example, if  fertilizer 
were further regulated, the intelligence community would have to make exceptions for farmers and 
gardeners who need to buy large amounts for their work or carpenters who need to buy nails in 
EXON,WZRXOGDOVREHGLIÀFXOWWRGHWHUPLQHKRZPXFKRI WKHVSHFLÀFPDWHULDOVRQHPXVWSXUFKDVH
to make that person’s activities suspicious.  Either an exception would need to be carved out for 
94 See Quadrennial Homeland Sec. Rev., supra note 86 (expressing that the Department of  Homeland Security is aware 
that it is “not possible to secure the American homeland simply with physical protections or through strategies that 
reinforce fear or isolation.”). 
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would make the list of  potential suspects endless.  Moreover, the government lacks the funding and 
resources to create and monitor such extensive lists. 
 
B. If the Government Regulates These Products, How Should They Be Monitored and By Whom? 
One possible way to monitor a select number of  common products that can be used for deadly 
purposes is to mirror the way in which some drugs are currently monitored and regulated.  For 
example, to purchase pseudoephedrine in some states, buyers must provide a driver’s license number 
and signature so that the state can keep track of  how much each person is buying in an attempt to 
reduce the drugs’ use in the creation of  methamphetamine.95  Already, a similar program is in place 
IRUWKHSXUFKDVHRI ÀUHZRUNVDQGVRPHW\SHVRI IHUWLOL]HUUHTXLULQJWKHVHOOHUWRZULWHGRZQWKHSHU-
sonal information of  purchasers of  certain items.96  However, while the intelligence community re-
quires records of  this type of  information for the purchase of  certain items, it fails to actually collect 
WKHGDWDLQDXQLÀHGIDVKLRQ5DWKHUWKHUHTXLUHPHQWLVPHUHO\WKDWVWRUHNHHSHUVNHHSWKHSXUFKDVH
UHFRUGVLQWKHHYHQWWKDWDQHQIRUFHPHQWRIÀFLDODVNVWRVHHWKHUHFRUGVVRPHWKLQJWKDWXVXDOO\
does not happen until after some sort of  tragedy or questionable event occurs.  Currently, electronic 
UHFRUGVDUHQRWHYHQPDQGDWRU\5HWDLOHUVFDQNHHSWKHQHFHVVDU\UHFRUGVKRZHYHUWKH\VHHÀW,I 
these types of  records were to be collected in some sort of  uniform fashion, the government’s use 
RI GDWDPLQLQJFRXOGEHFRPHXVHIXO3DWWHUQEDVHGGDWDPLQLQJFRXOGKHOSWKHJRYHUQPHQWÀQGXQ-
usual patterns in the amounts of  such materials being purchased, and would allow the government 
to match that information with the personal information provided by the customers.  This would 
not be an invasion of  people’s Fourth Amendment protections because consumers do not have the 
subjective expectation that retail records are kept private.97  Thus, a governmental search of  these 
UHFRUGVWKURXJKWKHXVHRI GDWDPLQLQJZRXOGQRWEHZLWKLQWKHGHÀQLWLRQRI D)RXUWK$PHQGPHQW
search.  
Realistically, this type of  monitoring should only be conducted when large amounts of  these 
deadly materials are purchased.  The government does not need to take down the personal informa-
WLRQRI DSHUVRQZKRPHUHO\EX\VDÀYHSRXQGEDJRI IHUWLOL]HUIRUH[DPSOHDVWKLVLVDQH[WUHPHO\
common purchase.  With records on such a large number of  people, the entire purpose of  moni-
toring would be defeated and the system would be overwhelmed.  Thus, a limit must be created at 
which point it becomes mandatory to record the personal information of  a purchaser.  For example, 
someone who attempts to buy over 100 pounds of  fertilizer may be noted.  Such a threshold would 
95 See, e.g., 19 va. admin. code § 30-220-10 (2013) (requiring “all pharmacies and retailers in the Commonwealth 
of  Virginia that sell cold and allergy medications containing ephedrine and/or pseudoephedrine products (PSE) 
to participate in a statewide electronic monitoring program, at no charge to the store, to record information about 
purchasers of  these products). See generally Combat Methamphetamine Epidemic Act of  2005, 12 U.S.C. §§ 701-56 
(2012) (authorizing states to enhance public safety when it comes to addressing the manufacture, sale, and use of  
methamphetamine, and providing federal funding for such programs).
96 See discussion Part III.A.–B.
97 See Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 746 (1979) (holding that people do not have a subjective expectation that 
telephone records are private).
create a more focused list of  “suspects” than if  every single purchaser of  potentially deadly materi-
als were recorded, no matter how small the amount they purchase. 
If  this type of  monitoring continues and expands, the intelligence community must update 
its method of  monitoring products.  The system of  monitoring who buys certain materials would 
be more useful in combating terrorism if  the intelligence community were to create a centralized 
database into which this information must be entered, rather than by asking storekeepers to keep 
their own individual records of  purchases.98  Such a database would allow sellers of  such products 
to easily enter the personal information of  the buyers into a computer program or website that 
would automatically transfer the information to agents responsible for searching the data for suspi-
FLRXVEX\LQJDFWLYLWLHV7KLVGDWDEDVHVKRXOGKDYHWKHFDSDELOLW\RI VRUWLQJWKURXJKWKHGDWDWRÀQG
patterns of  people who buy unusual amounts of  the materials being monitored in order to assist the 
various components of  the government to create potential watch lists.  This would take the weight 
off  of  retailers, on whom local law enforcement agents still depend to act as watchdogs and report 
suspicious activities.  
There is also a question of  who should be in charge of  monitoring this type of  activity.  Some 
believe that local police are more capable of  overseeing this type of  enforcement than federal agents 
when it comes to local intelligence collection.99  This seems to make the most sense in terms of  lo-
FDOPRQLWRULQJEXWLWFDQQRWEHH[SHFWHGWKDWORFDOODZHQIRUFHPHQWDJHQFLHVZLOOKDYHWKHÀQDQFLDO
capabilities to create such databases.  Thus, federal agencies such as DHS and the FBI must step in 
to help set up these monitoring programs and either continue to watch over them, or leave them 
in the hands of  local law enforcement.100  A national database of  every consumer buying fertilizer 
RUÀUHZRUNVFRXOGEHRYHUO\EXUGHQVRPHVRVXFKDFROOHFWLRQRI LQIRUPDWLRQVKRXOGEHORFDOL]HG
Because DHS is the umbrella agency in charge of  protecting the United States from terrorist attacks, 
DHS should take the lead in creating a program focused on the monitoring of  these common deadly 
materials. 
The issue of  privacy invasion is likely to arise if the government closely monitors individuals’ 
buying behaviors.  But this method of  surveillance is no more intrusive than that of  stores asking 
for customers’ e-mail addresses at the checkout counters in order to send promotions.  Additionally, 
there is likely no expectation of  privacy when it comes to what one buys.  Though customers do not 
need to provide e-mail addresses, in this situation it would likely be mandatory to provide a driver’s 
OLFHQVHRUVRPHRWKHURIÀFLDOIRUPRI LGHQWLÀFDWLRQLQRUGHUWRSXUFKDVHWKHKLJKULVNSURGXFWVLQ
large quantities.  No cases have been decided contesting the legality of  collecting this type of  infor-
98 See generally The comm’n on The inTelligence capabiliTies of The u.s. regarding weapons of mass 
desTrucTion, reporT To The presidenT of The u.s. 351, 366 (2005), available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/GPO-
WMD/pdf/GPO-WMD.pdf  (setting out recommendations for improving the collection capabilities of  the intelligence 
community by creating an integrated collection enterprise that ensures decentralized collection capabilities are developed 
in a way that is consistent with long-term strategic intelligence priorities and by encouraging a shift away from human 
data collectors and toward other methods).
99 See Samuel J. Rascoff, The Law of Homegrown (counter) Terrorism, 88 Tex. l. rev. 1715, 1720 (2010).
100  See generally Mickey McCarter, White House Proposes $39 Billion DHS Budget For FY 2014, hsToday.us (Apr. 11, 2013, 
8:00 AM), http://www.hstoday.us/single-article/white-house-proposes-39-billion-dhs-budget-for-fy-2014/7e5c4268d10
2ea4024dedad96bcc2e45.html (according to Secretary of  Homeland Security, Janet Napolitano, despite budget cuts and 
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would make the list of  potential suspects endless.  Moreover, the government lacks the funding and 
resources to create and monitor such extensive lists. 
 
B. If the Government Regulates These Products, How Should They Be Monitored and By Whom? 
One possible way to monitor a select number of  common products that can be used for deadly 
purposes is to mirror the way in which some drugs are currently monitored and regulated.  For 
example, to purchase pseudoephedrine in some states, buyers must provide a driver’s license number 
and signature so that the state can keep track of  how much each person is buying in an attempt to 
reduce the drugs’ use in the creation of  methamphetamine.95  Already, a similar program is in place 
IRUWKHSXUFKDVHRI ÀUHZRUNVDQGVRPHW\SHVRI IHUWLOL]HUUHTXLULQJWKHVHOOHUWRZULWHGRZQWKHSHU-
sonal information of  purchasers of  certain items.96  However, while the intelligence community re-
quires records of  this type of  information for the purchase of  certain items, it fails to actually collect 
WKHGDWDLQDXQLÀHGIDVKLRQ5DWKHUWKHUHTXLUHPHQWLVPHUHO\WKDWVWRUHNHHSHUVNHHSWKHSXUFKDVH
UHFRUGVLQWKHHYHQWWKDWDQHQIRUFHPHQWRIÀFLDODVNVWRVHHWKHUHFRUGVVRPHWKLQJWKDWXVXDOO\
does not happen until after some sort of  tragedy or questionable event occurs.  Currently, electronic 
UHFRUGVDUHQRWHYHQPDQGDWRU\5HWDLOHUVFDQNHHSWKHQHFHVVDU\UHFRUGVKRZHYHUWKH\VHHÀW,I 
these types of  records were to be collected in some sort of  uniform fashion, the government’s use 
RI GDWDPLQLQJFRXOGEHFRPHXVHIXO3DWWHUQEDVHGGDWDPLQLQJFRXOGKHOSWKHJRYHUQPHQWÀQGXQ-
usual patterns in the amounts of  such materials being purchased, and would allow the government 
to match that information with the personal information provided by the customers.  This would 
not be an invasion of  people’s Fourth Amendment protections because consumers do not have the 
subjective expectation that retail records are kept private.97  Thus, a governmental search of  these 
UHFRUGVWKURXJKWKHXVHRI GDWDPLQLQJZRXOGQRWEHZLWKLQWKHGHÀQLWLRQRI D)RXUWK$PHQGPHQW
search.  
Realistically, this type of  monitoring should only be conducted when large amounts of  these 
deadly materials are purchased.  The government does not need to take down the personal informa-
WLRQRI DSHUVRQZKRPHUHO\EX\VDÀYHSRXQGEDJRI IHUWLOL]HUIRUH[DPSOHDVWKLVLVDQH[WUHPHO\
common purchase.  With records on such a large number of  people, the entire purpose of  moni-
toring would be defeated and the system would be overwhelmed.  Thus, a limit must be created at 
which point it becomes mandatory to record the personal information of  a purchaser.  For example, 
someone who attempts to buy over 100 pounds of  fertilizer may be noted.  Such a threshold would 
95 See, e.g., 19 va. admin. code § 30-220-10 (2013) (requiring “all pharmacies and retailers in the Commonwealth 
of  Virginia that sell cold and allergy medications containing ephedrine and/or pseudoephedrine products (PSE) 
to participate in a statewide electronic monitoring program, at no charge to the store, to record information about 
purchasers of  these products). See generally Combat Methamphetamine Epidemic Act of  2005, 12 U.S.C. §§ 701-56 
(2012) (authorizing states to enhance public safety when it comes to addressing the manufacture, sale, and use of  
methamphetamine, and providing federal funding for such programs).
96 See discussion Part III.A.–B.
97 See Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 746 (1979) (holding that people do not have a subjective expectation that 
telephone records are private).
create a more focused list of  “suspects” than if  every single purchaser of  potentially deadly materi-
als were recorded, no matter how small the amount they purchase. 
If  this type of  monitoring continues and expands, the intelligence community must update 
its method of  monitoring products.  The system of  monitoring who buys certain materials would 
be more useful in combating terrorism if  the intelligence community were to create a centralized 
database into which this information must be entered, rather than by asking storekeepers to keep 
their own individual records of  purchases.98  Such a database would allow sellers of  such products 
to easily enter the personal information of  the buyers into a computer program or website that 
would automatically transfer the information to agents responsible for searching the data for suspi-
FLRXVEX\LQJDFWLYLWLHV7KLVGDWDEDVHVKRXOGKDYHWKHFDSDELOLW\RI VRUWLQJWKURXJKWKHGDWDWRÀQG
patterns of  people who buy unusual amounts of  the materials being monitored in order to assist the 
various components of  the government to create potential watch lists.  This would take the weight 
off  of  retailers, on whom local law enforcement agents still depend to act as watchdogs and report 
suspicious activities.  
There is also a question of  who should be in charge of  monitoring this type of  activity.  Some 
believe that local police are more capable of  overseeing this type of  enforcement than federal agents 
when it comes to local intelligence collection.99  This seems to make the most sense in terms of  lo-
FDOPRQLWRULQJEXWLWFDQQRWEHH[SHFWHGWKDWORFDOODZHQIRUFHPHQWDJHQFLHVZLOOKDYHWKHÀQDQFLDO
capabilities to create such databases.  Thus, federal agencies such as DHS and the FBI must step in 
to help set up these monitoring programs and either continue to watch over them, or leave them 
in the hands of  local law enforcement.100  A national database of  every consumer buying fertilizer 
RUÀUHZRUNVFRXOGEHRYHUO\EXUGHQVRPHVRVXFKDFROOHFWLRQRI LQIRUPDWLRQVKRXOGEHORFDOL]HG
Because DHS is the umbrella agency in charge of  protecting the United States from terrorist attacks, 
DHS should take the lead in creating a program focused on the monitoring of  these common deadly 
materials. 
The issue of  privacy invasion is likely to arise if the government closely monitors individuals’ 
buying behaviors.  But this method of  surveillance is no more intrusive than that of  stores asking 
for customers’ e-mail addresses at the checkout counters in order to send promotions.  Additionally, 
there is likely no expectation of  privacy when it comes to what one buys.  Though customers do not 
need to provide e-mail addresses, in this situation it would likely be mandatory to provide a driver’s 
OLFHQVHRUVRPHRWKHURIÀFLDOIRUPRI LGHQWLÀFDWLRQLQRUGHUWRSXUFKDVHWKHKLJKULVNSURGXFWVLQ
large quantities.  No cases have been decided contesting the legality of  collecting this type of  infor-
98 See generally The comm’n on The inTelligence capabiliTies of The u.s. regarding weapons of mass 
desTrucTion, reporT To The presidenT of The u.s. 351, 366 (2005), available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/GPO-
WMD/pdf/GPO-WMD.pdf  (setting out recommendations for improving the collection capabilities of  the intelligence 
community by creating an integrated collection enterprise that ensures decentralized collection capabilities are developed 
in a way that is consistent with long-term strategic intelligence priorities and by encouraging a shift away from human 
data collectors and toward other methods).
99 See Samuel J. Rascoff, The Law of Homegrown (counter) Terrorism, 88 Tex. l. rev. 1715, 1720 (2010).
100  See generally Mickey McCarter, White House Proposes $39 Billion DHS Budget For FY 2014, hsToday.us (Apr. 11, 2013, 
8:00 AM), http://www.hstoday.us/single-article/white-house-proposes-39-billion-dhs-budget-for-fy-2014/7e5c4268d10
2ea4024dedad96bcc2e45.html (according to Secretary of  Homeland Security, Janet Napolitano, despite budget cuts and 
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mation to purchase certain drugs.101  The system suggested here is no different from the current sys-
tem in place in pharmacies.  Because there is no expectation of  privacy with these types of  records, 
the government can search through them without a warrant, similarly to Smith v. Maryland,102 which 
authorized the use of  pen registries to monitor call logs. 
C. Will Enhanced Regulation Actually Thwart Criminal Activity? 
Enhanced regulation as outlined above could help alert law enforcement agents of  suspicious 
DFWLYLW\EXWRQHFDQQRWGHÀQLWLYHO\NQRZLI LWZLOODFWXDOO\WKZDUWFULPLQDODFWLYLW\%HFDXVHWKH
intelligence community cannot monitor and regulate every single product and there are countless 
common items that can be turned into deadly devices, heightened monitoring of  just a few items 
will probably not actually prevent future terrorist attacks.  Because of  the countless possibilities for 
materials that can be used for deadly purposes, once one material is monitored or regulated mak-
LQJLWPRUHGLIÀFXOWWRREWDLQWHUURULVWVZLOOWXUQWRDQRWKHUPDWHULDOWKDWKDVQRUHJXODWLRQ7KXV
the cycle will be endless, and terrorists will always be looking for alternative materials to use that are 
unregulated, since the government cannot regulate every potentially dangerous product due to its 
constitutional restraints and limited resources.
V. conclusion
Even if  the intelligence community chooses select materials to regulate and monitor for suspi-
FLRXVEX\LQJSDWWHUQVWHUURULVWVZLOOÀQGQHZPDWHULDOVDQGWKHF\FOHZLOOEHHQGOHVV)XUWKHULI WKH
intelligence community continues to add all of  these new materials to its watch-lists, it will erode 
the privacy rights of  U.S. citizens.  It is not worth spending American tax dollars on the monitoring 
of  common materials unless the materials themselves are hazardous to U.S. citizens, such as various 
varieties of  fertilizer, which are highly explosive standing alone with no provocation.  But it seems 
IRROLVKWRPRQLWRUSUHVVXUHFRRNHUVDQGHYHQFRQVXPHUÀUHZRUNVZKLFKKDYHVROLWWOHH[SORVLYH
material one would have to buy thousands to make any sort of  deadly device.  Therefore, the intelli-
gence community’s data mining activities in regard to terrorists’ purchases should focus on materials 
that are deadly intrinsically. 
 
101 As of  July 23, 2013, there are no judicial decisions on this type of  purchase with respect to consumer privacy.
102 442 U.S. 735, 746 (1979).
